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I. INTRODUCTION
[1]
On October 23, 2007, the United States announced an initiative to
strengthen intellectual property enforcement measures within the
international community via the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement
(“ACTA”).1 During the following years, eleven rounds of negotiations
among as many parties2 culminated in a finalized text released on
December 3, 2010.3 The dialogue occurred outside the purview of

1

See OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, TRADE FACTS: ANTICOUNTERFEITING
TRADE
AGREEMENT
(ACTA)
(Aug.
4,
2008),
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/factsheets/2008/asset_upload_file760_150
84.pdf.
2

See ACTA Negotiations: Report on Round Eleven, N.Z. MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
& TRADE, http://www.mfat.govt.nz/Trade-and-Economic-Relations/Trade-Relationshipsand-Agreements/Anti-Counterfeiting/0-acta-negotiations11.php (last updated Oct. 4,
2010).
3

See OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, ANTI-COUNTERFEITING TRADE
AGREEMENT (2010), available at http://www.ustr.gov/webfm_send/2417 [hereinafter
FINAL TEXT].
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existing bodies such as the WIPO and WTO.4 The ACTA now awaits
acceptance following the March 31, 2011 commencement of the
ratification period.5 It will enter into force thirty days following the sixth
formal approval.6
[2]
The Members of the European Parliament hinted toward
acceptance of the ACTA, but simultaneously expressed hesitation, when
they referred to the ACTA as “a step in the right direction,” yet sought
confirmation from the European Commission that the treaty would not
affect current EU legislation.7 The EU joined ten others as an intimate
participant in ACTA negotiations, though the agreement identifies thirtyeight distinct political entities as potential signatories.8 Presumably, all
will ratify the agreement they helped create.
[3]
The ACTA is a plurilateral agreement, meaning it binds fewer
parties than that of a traditional multilateral agreement.9 The ACTA
attempts to establish international standards on intellectual property rights
enforcement and combat the “proliferation of counterfeit and pirated
goods.”10 Japan and the United States created the initial momentum for

4

See Danny O’Brien, Blogging ACTA Across The Globe: The View from France, ELEC.
FRONTIER FOUND. (Jan. 28, 2010), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2010/01/acta-andfrance.
5

FINAL TEXT, supra note 3, at ch. 6, art. 39.

6

See id. at ch. 6, art. 40.

7

See Press Release, European Parliament, Anti-Counterfeiting Accord: MEPs Set Out
Content Conditions for Ratifying the Deal (Nov. 24, 2010), available at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/pdfs/news/expert/infopress/20101124IPR99549/20101124
IPR99549_en.pdf (internal quotation marks omitted).
8

See FINAL TEXT, supra note 3, at ch. 6, art. 39 n.17.

9

See generally Michael Geist, The ACTA Threat To The Future Of WIPO, INTELL.
PROP. WATCH (Apr. 14, 2009), http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/2009/04/14/the-actathreat-to-the-future-of-wipo/ (noting that the ACTA’s plurilateral status handily
circumvents potential WIPO restrictions regarding multilateral agreements).
10

See FINAL TEXT, supra note 3, at pmbl.
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the ACTA, but other countries soon joined the negotiations.11 By the time
official negotiations began, the parties included “Australia, Canada, the
European Union, Japan, Jordan, Korea, Mexico, Morocco, New Zealand,
Singapore, Switzerland, the United Arab Emirates, and the United
States.”12
[4]
The culmination of the negotiations was the eleventh round, hosted
on October 2, 2010, in Tokyo, Japan.13 Several countries were notably
absent from this negotiation, which produced the final text. Both Jordan
and the United Arab Emirates, though present during the first round,
dropped out before the second.14 Perhaps more significant was China’s
complete absence.15 China has the world’s third largest economy, but is
also one of the largest sources of counterfeit goods.16 India, the world’s
11

See All You Want to Know About the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA),
EUR. COMMISSION, 1 (Oct. 20, 2010), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2010/
october/tradoc_146792.pdf.
12

EU, US and Others Hold Geneva Talks on Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, EUR.
COMMISSION (June 5, 2008), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2008/june/tradoc_
139086.pdf.
13

Press Release, European Commission, Joint Statement from All the Negotiating Parties
to ACTA (Oct. 2, 2010), available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/
index.cfm?id=623.
14

Compare EU, US and Others Hold Geneva Talks on Anti-Counterfeiting Trade
Agreement, supra note 12 (summarizing round one of ACTA negotiations), with AntiCounterfeiting: EU, US and Others Meet in Washington to Advance ACTA, EUR. UNION,
EU/NR 75/08 (July 31, 2008), http://www.eurunion.org/eu/2008-News-Releases/ANTICOUNTERFEITING-EUROPEAN-UNION-UNITED-STATES-AND-OTHERS-MEETIN-WASHINGTON-TO-ADVANCE-ANTI-COUNTERFEITING-TRADEAGREEMENT-ACTA.html (summarizing round two of ACTA negotiations).
15

See Intellectual Property: Anti-Counterfeiting, EUR. COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/
trade/creating-opportunities/trade-topics/intellectual-property/anti-counterfeiting/
(last
updated Dec. 20, 2010) (providing a list of countries, excluding China, that participated
in negotiations).
16

See Country Comparison: GDP (Purchasing Power Parity), in CENT. INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK (2010), available at https://www.cia.gov/library/
publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2001rank.html; see also Mark Litke, China
Big in Counterfeit Goods, ABC NEWS (Apr. 21, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/
WNT/story?id=130381.
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fifth largest economy, was also absent.17 According to one Indian
government official, they never even received an invitation to join the
negotiations.18
[5]
The $272.7 million in counterfeit products seized by the U.S.
Customs and Border Patrol in 2008 could explain China and India’s
absence from the negotiations.19 China was the principal source of seized
goods, making up eighty-one percent of the total value seized.20 India
ranked a distant second in overall number of seizures at six percent.21
With so many counterfeit goods originating from China and, to a lesser
extent, India, perhaps the negotiating parties viewed them with
suspicion.22
[6]
While the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (“USTR”)
describes the ACTA as “a state-of-the-art international framework that
provides a model for effectively combating global proliferation of

17

See Country Comparison, supra note 16; see also Intellectual Property: AntiCounterfeiting, supra note 15 (providing a list of countries, excluding India, that
participated in negotiations).
18

See Monika Ermert, Indian Official: ACTA Out Of Sync With TRIPS and Public
Health,
INTELL.
PROP.
WATCH
(May
5,
2010),
http://www.ipwatch.org/weblog/2010/05/05/indian-official-acta-out-of-sync-with-trips-and-publichealth/.
19

See U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS, SEIZURE STATISTICS: FISCAL YEAR 2008 14 (2009), available at
http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/trade/priority_trade/ipr/pubs/seizure/fy08_final_sta
t.ctt/fy08_final_stat.pdf.
20

Id.

21

Id.

22

Commencement of negotiations predated the statistics cited, but earlier data show
similar trends. See id. at 12; see also Lawrence Liang, We’ve All Got Some Baggage, 7
TEHELKA
MAG.,
no.
45
(Nov.
13,
2010),
available
at
http://www.tehelka.com/story_main47.asp?filename=Ne131110We_ve_All.asp (stating
that “India and China have consistently made it to the [United States Trade
Representative] priority watch list for the past ten years . . . ”).
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commercial-scale counterfeiting and piracy,”23 the ACTA has not
universally received such acclaim.24 This Article examines two of the
more credible criticisms leveled against the ACTA and evaluates the
credibility of each. First, some allege that the agreement is a treaty
masquerading as an executive agreement.25 The distinction is significant
because treaties may modify U.S. law and require congressional approval,
while executive agreements must accord with existing law and require
only presidential approval.26 The second criticism is the systemic lack of
transparency throughout the negotiation process.27 Though these are not
the only criticisms – far from it – they are the two most significant and
stand on the most solid ground. Yet, neither poses an insurmountable
hindrance to the ACTA. To understand these arguments, this Article must
first delve into the latest public text of the ACTA, published December 3,
2010.28
II. SUMMARY OF THE FINALIZED TEXT
[7]
The ACTA is organized into six chapters.29 Chapter I contains
introductory matters and definitions.30 Chapter II, the largest, contains
most of the substantive provisions.31 Chapter III contains provisions on
23

OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, ANTI-COUNTERFEITING TRADE
AGREEMENT (ACTA), available at http://www.ustr.gov/acta (last visited Apr. 6, 2011).
24

See Eddan, Katz, Stopping the ACTA Juggernaut, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Nov. 19,
2009), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2009/11/stopping-acta-juggernaut.
25

See infra Part III.

26

Treaty vs. Executive Agreement, U.S. DEP’T STATE, http://www.state.gov/s/l/treaty/
faqs/70133.htm (last visited Apr. 6, 2011).
27

See infra Part IV.

28

See generally FINAL TEXT, supra note 3.

29

See id.

30

See id. at ch. 1.

31

See id. at ch. 2.
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enforcement practices.32
Chapter IV encourages international
cooperation.33
Chapter V establishes the ACTA Committee, the
administrative body overseeing and managing the ACTA framework.34
Chapter VI concludes the agreement.35 Earlier versions of the ACTA
were narrowly focused on counterfeit trademark goods, but its scope has
gradually broadened, and now matches that of TRIPS, by including
copyrights, trademarks, trade secrets, and patents.36
[8]
Although the ACTA will raise the minimum standard for
intellectual property rights and enforcement measures among signatory
countries, it does so without creating a ceiling.37 Many of the provisions
are flexible, using language such as the permissive “may” rather than the
mandatory “shall.”38 Similarly, although the ACTA encompasses all
major intellectual property regimes, it treats both patents and trade secrets
somewhat tangentially.39 A signatory nation may exclude patents and
trade secrets from the civil enforcement section40 and the ACTA
32

See id. at ch. 3.

33

See id. at ch. 4.

34

See FINAL TEXT, supra note 3, at ch. 5.

35

See id. at ch. 6.

36

Id. at pmbl. (applying the ACTA to all “intellectual property rights”); see also Mart
Kuhn, Intellectual Property Owners Oppose Anti-Counterfeiting Agreement, PUB.
KNOWLEDGE (July 14, 2010, 10:50 AM), http://www.publicknowledge.org/blog/ipowners-oppose-acta (stating that the ACTA “has expanded far beyond its stated intended
purpose . . .”).
37

See FINAL TEXT, supra note 3, at ch. 1, § 1, art. 2.

38

See, e.g., id. at ch. 2, § 2, art. 8 (“[A] Party may limit the remedies available . . . .”)
(emphasis added).
39

See id. at ch. 2, § 2 n.2.

40

See id. at ch 2, § 1. India, among others, opposed the inclusion of patented goods in
the Civil Enforcement section, arguing that doing so would impede trade of otherwise
legal generic pharmaceuticals. See Concerns Raised over ACTA at TRIPS Council,
THIRD WORLD NETWORK (Nov. 1, 2010), available at http://www.twnside.org.sg/
title2/intellectual_property/info.service/2010/ipr.info.101102.htm.
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affirmatively deems them “outside the scope” of the border measures
section.41 The sections on civil enforcement and border measures,
arguably the two most substantive of all, dilute the ACTA’s strength in
fighting patent infringement and trade secret misappropriation.42
Conversely, the sections governing criminal enforcement, enforcement in
the digital environment, enforcement practices, and international
cooperation exclude neither patents nor trade secrets.43
A. Chapter One: Initial Provisions and General Definitions
[9]
The provisions of the ACTA take into consideration superseding
prior treaties, notably the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS”).44 Indeed, the ACTA inherits its
objectives and principles from TRIPS.45 Importantly, if a signatory does
not recognize a particular intellectual property right, the ACTA creates no
obligation to do so.46 Thus, ratifying the ACTA cannot force a signatory
to create entire categories of intellectual property, nor can it force into
existence an intellectual property right the signatory does not
independently desire.47
[10] Trademarks tend to be geographical creatures, and the ACTA
recognizes this traditional limitation.48 By definition, “counterfeit
trademark goods” include products or packaging bearing a mark identical
41

FINAL TEXT, supra note 3, at ch. 2, § 3, art. 13 n.6.

42

See generally id. at ch. 2, §§ 2-3.

43

See id. at ch. 2, §§ 4-5, ch. 3-4.

44

See id. at ch. 1, § 1, art. 1.

45

See id. at ch. 1, § 1, art. 2.

46

See id. ch. 1, § 1, art. 3.

47

See FINAL TEXT, supra note 3, at ch. 1, § 1, art. 3.

48

See id. at ch. 1, § 1, art. 3 (“This Agreement shall be without prejudice to provisions in
a Party’s law governing the availability, acquisition, scope, and maintenance of
intellectual property rights.”).

7

Richmond Journal of Law and Technology

Vol. XVII, Issue 4

to or “which cannot be distinguished in its essential aspects from” a
trademark registered in the signatory country.49 While the standard
articulated by this definition differs in literal form from the “identical
with, or substantially indistinguishable from” standard normally applied
under U.S. trademark law,50 it seems functionally equivalent. “[P]irated
copyright goods” means, in essence, goods created by unauthorized
copying, thereby infringing a copyright.51
[11] Curiously, the definition for “right holder” explicitly “includes a
federation or an association,” but conspicuously omits the author or
inventor.52 The fact that corporate interests apparently eclipse those of
individual content creators does nothing to assuage criticism from groups
alleging that, though “the Agreement has huge implications for the public,
few substantive steps have been taken to inform, engage, or even consider
the public interest.”53
B. Chapter Two: Legal Framework for Enforcement of
Intellectual Property Rights
[12] Chapter II is the longest, most substantive segment of the
document.54 As TRIPS has already established, each signatory must have
general legal measures in place for enforcement of intellectual property
rights.55 Civil remedies in each country must follow the structure
49

Id. at ch. 1, § 2, art. 5(d).

50

See 18 U.S.C. § 2320(e)(1)(A)(ii) (2006).

51

See FINAL TEXT, supra note 3, at ch. 1, § 2, art. 5(k).

52

See id. at ch. 1, § 2, art. 5(l).

53

See, e.g., Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, PUB. KNOWLEDGE,
http://www.publicknowledge.org/anti-counterfeiting-trade-agreement (last visited Apr.
16, 2011).
54

See generally FINAL TEXT, supra note 3, at ch. 2.

55

See WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights, pt. 3, § 1, art. 41, http://www.wto.org/english/
docs_e/legal_e/27-trips.pdf [hereinafter TRIPS]; see also FINAL TEXT, supra note 3, at
ch. 2, § 1, art. 6.
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provided by the ACTA.56 While preliminary injunctions must remain
available “to prevent goods that involve the infringement of an intellectual
property right from entering into the channels of commerce,” there is no
universal standard for remedy.57 Therefore, standards will likely continue
to vary by locality. Furthermore, all signatories are required to adopt a
statutory system for calculating damages in copyright and trademark
infringement cases.58 Prior to the ACTA, not all signatory countries made
statutory damages available.59 Comparatively, U.S. law previously
provided for statutory damages. 60 The ACTA requires attorney’s fees for
at least copyright and trademark infringement suits, but the qualifier
“where appropriate” renders the requirement somewhat impotent.61
Additional remedies include confiscation and destruction of infringing
goods.62
[13] Section three of Chapter II provides for border measures to combat
infringement of copyrights and trademarks but specifically excludes
patents and trade secrets.63 Signatories must enable their customs agents
to act on their own accord or at the request of a rights holder to search
incoming goods for infringing material.64 Analysis of earlier drafts of the
ACTA raised fears of “iPod searching border guards” – fears later allayed
56

See FINAL TEXT, supra note 3, at ch. 2, § 2, art. 7.

57

Id. at ch. 2, § 2, art. 8.

58

See id. at ch. 2, § 2, art. 9.

59

For example, the U.K. currently awards damages “on a case-by-case basis based on the
actual damages incurred.” See ACTA in the UK, TECHNOLLAMA (Oct. 16, 2010),
http://www.technollama.co.uk/acta-in-theuk?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_
campaign=acta-in-the-uk.
60

See generally 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c)-(d) (2006); 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2006).

61

See FINAL TEXT, supra note 3, at ch. 2, § 2, art. 9.

62

See id. at ch. 2, § 2, art. 10.

63

See id. at ch. 2, § 3, art. 13 & n.6.

64

See id. at ch. 2, § 3, art. 16.
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by the addition of a de minimis carve-out.65 Yet, perhaps that carve-out
provides only hollow comfort in light of its permissive, rather than
mandatory, nature.66 Furthermore, the signatory’s “competent authorities”
may begin their own investigation to determine “whether the suspect
goods infringe an intellectual property right.”67 That is, signatory
countries may allow their customs agents: (1) to search an individual’s
personal electronic device; (2) confiscate the device upon suspicion of
infringing goods; (3) perform an internal investigation; (4) determine that
the device in fact contains infringing goods; (5) and charge the individual
with civil liability.68 According to Canadian law professor Michael Geist,
throughout the ACTA negotiations, the United States “push[ed] for broad
provisions that cover import, export, and in-transit shipments,” while other
countries advocated softening the border-searching provision. 69
[14] Section four of Chapter II, titled “Criminal Enforcement,” does not
exclude patents and trade secrets, as did the previous two sections.70
Signatories must provide criminal repercussions for at least commercial
willful infringement, including either fines or jail time.71 The country’s
authorities can seize and destroy counterfeit trademark goods and pirated
65

See Michael Geist, ACTA's De Minimis Provision: Countering the iPod Searching
Border Guard Fears, MICHAEL GEIST (Mar. 23, 2010), http://www.michaelgeist.ca/
content/view/4900/125/.
66

See FINAL TEXT, supra note 3, at ch. 2, § 3, art. 14 (“A party may exclude from the
application of this Section small quantities of goods of a non commercial nature
contained in travellers’ [sic] personal luggage.”) (emphasis added).
67

Id. at ch. 2, § 3, art. 19.

68

See id. at ch. 2, § 3, art. 16. It is entirely unclear to the Author how a customs agent
would be able to have any reasonable basis to suspect that a particular song on an
individual’s iPod was obtained without the right holder’s authorization. Cf. id.
(describing the actions customs authorities may take “upon their own initiative”).
69

See Michael Geist, Putting Together the ACTA Puzzle: Privacy, P2P Major Targets,
MICHAEL GEIST (Feb. 3, 2009), http://www.michaelgeist.ca/content/view/3660/125/.
70

See FINAL TEXT, supra note 3, at ch. 2, § 4.

71

See id. at ch. 2, § 4, art. 24 & n.12.
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copyright goods “without compensation of any sort to the infringer.”72 As
in the civil enforcement section, the ACTA also would have countries
authorize their officials to initiate their own investigation ex officio.73
[15] The fifth section, titled “Enforcement of Intellectual Property
Rights in the Digital Environment,” is known colloquially as the “Internet
Chapter.”74 It extends the provisions of sections two and four to the
context of the Internet.75 In a move that may target both commercial and
non-commercial peer-to-peer file-sharing, the ACTA requires parties to
take measures against “unlawful use of means of widespread distribution
for infringing purposes.”76 Parties are authorized to order Internet service
providers to reveal a user’s identity to a rights holder upon the filing of an
infringement claim.77 Finally, this chapter includes provisions consistent
with the anti-circumvention provisions of the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act (“DMCA”), which spreads rights management protections
abroad.78

72

See id. at ch. 2, § 4, art. 25. These provisions explicitly reference the confiscation and
destruction of counterfeit and pirated goods, thereby inferring by omission that a
signatory need not permit the confiscation and destruction of goods that merely infringe
rather than counterfeit . See id.
73

See id. at ch. 2, § 4, art. 26.

74

See id. at § 5; Mike Masnick, ACTA's Internet Chapter Leaks; And, Now We See How
Sneaky The Negotiators Have Been, TECHDIRT (Feb. 22, 2010, 11:40 AM),
http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20100222/0215038248.shtml.
75

See FINAL TEXT, supra note 3, at ch. 2, § 5, art. 27 (referring to the Internet has the
“digital environment”).
76

Id.

77

See id. This process mirrors the litigation strategy regularly employed by the
Recording Industry Association of America (“RIAA”). See Eric Bangeman, Leaked
Letter Shows RIAA Pressuring ISPs, Planning Discounts for Early Settlements,
ARSTECHNICA, http://arstechnica.com/old/content/2007/02/8832.ars (last updated Feb.
13, 2007, 11:59 AM).
78

See FINAL TEXT, supra note 3, at ch. 2, § 5, art. 27; see also Digital Millennium
Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2006).
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C. Chapter Five: The ACTA Committee
[16] Chapter V creates the ACTA Committee, an international
administrative body existing separately from WIPO, the WTO, or any
other pre-existing entity.79
The Committee reviews the ACTA’s
implementation and operation, considers amendments, and oversees the
accession of new signatories.80
III. EXECUTIVE AGREEMENT OR TREATY?
[17] Some offices within the U.S. federal government refuse to define
the ACTA as a treaty, but rather see it as an executive agreement.81
Courts apply an easier ratification standard to executive agreements,
requiring only the signature of the President, not congressional approval.82
However, such agreements should not override federal or state law unless
“the President has independent constitutional or statutory authority to do
so.”83 Conversely, the agreement can properly bypass requirements for
congressional review or approval if it contains no discrepancies with
existing U.S. law.84 Thus, if the ACTA requires the reform of any U.S.
law, it would be precluded from sole executive agreement status and
79

See id. at ch. 5, art. 36; cf. O’Brien, supra note 4 (noting that “ACTA [was] negotiated
outside of the traditional and relatively transparent IPR policy-making arenas, such as the
WTO or WIPO”).
80

See FINAL TEXT, supra note 3, at ch. 5, art. 36.

81

See, e.g., Eddan Katz & Gwen Hinze, The Impact of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade
Agreement on the Knowledge Economy: The Accountability of the Office of the U.S.
Trade Representative for the Creation of IP Enforcement Norms Through Executive
Trade Agreements, 35 YALE J. INT’L. L. ONLINE 24, 27, 30 (2009),
http://www.yjil.org/docs/pub/o-35-katz-hinze-ACTA-on-knowledge-economy.pdf.
82

See Bradford R. Clark, Domesticating Sole Executive Agreements, 93 VA. L. REV.
1573, 1576, 1580 (2007).
83

Id. at 1655.

84

See id. at 1597-98, 1660-61 (stating that executive agreements are constitutional so
long as “such agreements--in and of themselves—[are not used by the President] as a
basis for altering preexisting legal rights.”).
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would have to come before Congress for approval.85 Though this would
slow the ACTA’s already glacial pace, any added infusion of scrutiny,
oversight, and transparency would undoubtedly meet a warm reception
with the public interest groups currently opposed to the ACTA. As the
Electronic Frontier Foundation contends, “congressional advice and
approval . . . is integral to the [C]onstitution’s delicate balance of
executive and legislative powers.”86
[18] Earlier versions of the ACTA contained provisions conflicting
directly with U.S. law.87 Over the numerous iterations, certain provisions
were subject to a disproportionate amount of opposition from both private
industry and the public at large.88 The four provisions drawing the most
fire were either removed or diluted.89 The first provision under fire
required an international notice-and-takedown procedure similar to that
currently existing under the DMCA.90 The second provision imposed
third-party liability.91 The third provision instituted a graduated response,
or “three strikes” rule, which would have required laws permanently

85

See id. (“Unless a sole executive agreement is adopted as a ‘Treaty’ or as a ‘Law’ using
these procedures, the Supremacy Clause does not recognize it as a basis for overriding
existing law.”).
86

Katz, supra note 24.

87

See Gwen Hinze, Preliminary Analysis of the Officially Released ACTA Text, ELEC.
FRONTIER FOUND. (Apr. 22, 2010), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2010/04/eff-analysisofficially-released-acta-text.
88

See id.

89

See generally OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, ACTA –SUMMARY OF
KEY ELEMENTS UNDER DISCUSSION (2009), available at http://www.ustr.gov/aboutus/press-office/fact-sheets/2009/november/acta-summary-key-elements-under-discussion.
90

See Michael Geist, EU ACTA Analysis Leaks: Confirms Plans For Global DMCA,
Encourage
3
Strikes
Model,
MICHAEL
GEIST
(Nov.
30,
2009),
http://www.michaelgeist.ca/content/view/4575/125/.
91

See Hinze, supra note 81.
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revoking a user’s right to Internet access after three copyright violations.92
Finally, the fourth provision imposed mandatory criminalization of noncommercial copyright infringement,93 as well as “‘inciting, aiding and
abetting’” such infringement.94 None of these provisions survived to the
ACTA’s final draft.
[19] A blanket statement allowing exceptions could eliminate the
possibility of conflict, but perhaps at the cost of reducing the entire
agreement to impotency. One commentator suggests circumventing any
inconsistencies with an article that allows signatories to create exceptions
“necessary to address the objectives and principles of the TRIPS
agreement.”95 Indeed, the USTR, which represented the United States in
ACTA negotiations, argued that Chapter I, Article 2 allows lawmakers to
ignore any provisions of the agreement that might require reform, thereby
removing any need for the United States to change domestic law.96 The
USTR refers to the same language used in TRIPS: “[Members] shall be
free to determine the appropriate method of implementing the provisions
of this Agreement within its own legal system and practice.”97 The fatal

92

See Gwen Hinze, Leaked ACTA Internet Provisions: Three Strikes and a Global
DMCA, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Nov. 3, 2009), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2009/11/
leaked-acta-internet-provisions-three-strikes-and-.
93

Leak: EU Pushes for Criminalizing Non-Commercial Usages in ACTA, LA
QUADRATURE DU NET (June 24, 2010), http://www.laquadrature.net/en/leak-eu-pushesfor-criminalizing-non-commercial-usages-in-acta.
94

Id.

95

See James Love, Areas Where the Oct 2, 2010 ACTA Text Is Inconsistent with U.S.
Law,
KNOWLEDGE
ECOLOGY
INT’L
(Oct.
9,
2010,
9:59
AM),
http://keionline.org/node/970 (internal quotation marks omitted).
96

See James Love, USTR's Implausible Claim that ACTA Article 1.2 Is an All Purpose
Loophole, and the Ramifications If True, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT’L (Oct. 22, 2010,
2:23 PM), http://keionline.org/node/990; see also FINAL TEXT, supra note 3, at ch. 1, § 1,
art. 2.
97

Compare FINAL TEXT, supra note 3, at ch. 1, § 1, art. 2; with TRIPS, supra note 55, at
pt. 1, art. 1.
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flaw to the strategy is that, in the context of TRIPS, the language has been
found to not be a free pass from compliance.98
[20] In fact, on October 8, 2010, Senator Wyden asked a branch of the
Library of Congress for an analysis of the October 2 ACTA text to
evaluate whether any conflicts existed with then-current U.S. law.99 The
USTR had previously assured Senator Wyden that the ACTA does not
provide “a vehicle for changing U.S. law,” but instead would “provide
appropriate flexibility.”100 Shortly thereafter, on October 19, 2010,
Senators Bernard Sanders and Sherrod Brown requested a similar analysis
from the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”),101 which
advises the executive branch on intellectual property policy.102 Director
David Kappos replied with a letter dated November 12, 2010103 that
Senator Sanders described as a “non-response” for its lack of any firm
98

See Carlos Correa, Developing Countries and the TRIPS Agreement, THIRD WORLD
NETWORK (1999), http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/correa-cn.htm (Any deviation from the
standards set forth by the Agreement may lead to a dispute settlement procedure within
the WTO . . . . ).
99

Letter from Ron Wyden, Senator, U.S. Senate, to Karen Lewis, Assistant Dir., Am.
Law Div., Cong. Research Serv./Library of Cong. (Oct. 8, 2010), available at
http://wyden.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Sen%20Wyden%20Request%20for%20Legal%2
0Review%20of%20ACTA%20Oct%202010.pdf.
100

Letter from Ron Kirk, Ambassador, U.S. Trade Representative, to Ron Wyden,
Senator, U.S. Senate (Jan. 28, 2010), available at http://wyden.senate.gov/imo/
media/doc/USTR%20Response%20to%20ACTA%20Letter.pdf.
101

Letter from Bernard Sanders, Senator, U.S. Senate, and Sherrod Brown, Senator, U.S.
Senate, to David Kappos, Dir., U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (Oct. 19, 2010),
available
at
http://keionline.org/sites/default/files/senator_sanders_brown_kappos_
19oct2010.pdf.
102

U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, OFFICE OF THE ADMINISTRATOR FOR EXTERNAL
AFFAIRS (EA), available at http://www.uspto.gov/about/offices/ip/index.jsp (last updated
Jan. 13, 2011).
103

See Letter from David Kappos, Dir., U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, to Bernard
Sanders, Senator, U.S. Senate, and Sherrod Brown, Senator, U.S. Senate (Nov. 12, 2010),
available
at
http://keionline.org/sites/default/files/kappos_sanders_brown_acta_
12nov2010.pdf.
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answer or analysis.104 Meanwhile, the “USPTO provided technical advice
on the enforcement of intellectual property rights to USTR.”105 Others
argue that whether the ACTA can successfully “color within the lines of
existing U.S. laws” is ultimately of little consequence.106 Regardless of
the ACTA’s requirements for legal reform, it might simply be too
expansive to fit within the constitutionally permitted exercise of the
President’s executive power.107 By committing the United States to a new
international framework for intellectual property enforcement, it opens the
door to as-yet undetermined amendments.108 Indeed, an open letter from
nearly eighty legal scholars vehemently opposes the agreement on this
ground, among others.109 The USTR continues to characterize the
agreement as an executive agreement rather than a treaty; a
characterization described by scholars as possibly “unlawful.”110
[21] Two existing provisions commonly argued as inconsistent with
U.S. law are the sections on civil enforcement, addressing injunctions,
104

See James Love, Non-Responsive Letter from David Kappos of USPTO to Senators
Sanders and Brown Regarding ACTA Consistency with US Law, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY
INT’L (Nov. 17, 2010, 12:56 PM), http://keionline.org/node/1022.
105

VICTORIA A. ESPINEL, 2010 U.S. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT
COORDINATOR ANNUAL REPORT ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT 36 (2011),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/IPEC/ipec_annual_report
_feb2011.pdf.
106

See Rob Pegoraro, Copyright Overreach Goes on World Tour, WASH. POST (Nov. 15,
2009), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/11/13/AR20091113
00852_pf.html.
107

See Sean Flynn, ACTA's Constitutional Problem, AM. U. (Nov. 15, 2010),
http://www.wcl.american.edu/pijip/go/blog-post/acta-s-constitutional-problem.
108

See FINAL TEXT, supra note 3, at ch. 5, art. 36; see also FINAL TEXT, supra note 3, ch.
6, art. 42.
109

See Letter from Brook Baker, Ne. Univ. Sch. of Law, et al. to Barack Obama,
President, U.S. (Oct. 28, 2010), available at http://www.wcl.american.edu/pijip/go/blogpost/academic-sign-on-letter-to-obama-on-acta [hereinafter Letter to Obama].
110

See id.; see also Sherwin Sly, The Trouble with ACTA, Am. Const. Soc. (Apr. 6,
2010), http://www.acslaw.org/node/15774.
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damages, and other remedies, and the section on border measures.111
Although critics raised these arguments upon the release of earlier drafts
of the agreement, the provisions remain in the finalized December 3
version of the text.112 However, none of the inconsistencies actually
require legal change. Rather, the permissive language of the agreement
allows enough flexibility that the legislature could enact new laws and
remain in compliance.
A. Injunctions
[22] If applied to patents, the injunction provision could conflict with
current U.S. law. The ACTA requires the availability of injunctive relief
“to prevent goods that involve the infringement of an intellectual property
right from entering into the channels of commerce,” except when adequate
remuneration or compensation for infringement is available.113 This
infringement provision appears in the civil enforcement section, which
would apply to patents at the signatory’s discretion.114 If the United States
does not exclude patents, the injunction requirements would exceed
current U.S. law. Currently, physicians performing best-practice medical
procedures, though they may infringe a patent claim, are not liable for any
damages or subject to an injunction against further use.115 Thus, the patent
holder is denied both injunctive and monetary relief, contrary to the
ACTA’s requirements.116 Similarly, a patent holder’s recovery is often
significantly limited when the infringer is a state government.117
111

See Love, supra note 104; see also FINAL TEXT, supra note 3, at ch. 2, § 2, art. 8-10;
see also FINAL TEXT, supra note 3, at ch. 2, § 3.
112

See FINAL TEXT, supra note 3, at ch. 2, § 2, art. 8-10; see also FINAL TEXT, supra note
3, at ch. 2, § 3.
113

Id. at ch. 2, § 2, art. 8.

114

See id. at ch. 2, § 2 n.2.

115

See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e) (1); 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (1).

116

See FINAL TEXT, supra note 3, at ch. 2, § 2, art. 7-9.

117

See Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627,
641-44 (1999). Sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment protects state
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[23] Michèle Rivasi of the European Parliament submitted a formal
inquiry to the European Commission regarding whether the ACTA’s
language would negatively impact access to generic medicine, especially
in developing countries.118 The Commission responded by noting that the
civil enforcement chapter’s provisions are permissive rather than
obligatory, therefore do not require any country to impose restrictions on
the trade of patent-protected goods.119 As noted, this provision will
comply with current U.S. law only if its parent section is denied any
application to patent law.120 For the ACTA to succeed as an executive
agreement, the United States must choose to exclude patents from the
section on injunctions.
B. Damages and Other Remedies
[24] Under the ACTA, a court must have the authority to grant
monetary damages to a rights holder as compensation for willful
infringement.121 In determining damages, a court should consider “any
legitimate measure of value the right holder submits, which may include
lost profits, the value of the infringed goods or services measured by the
market price, or the suggested retail price.”122
[25] These requirements do not incorporate or allow for the exceptions
currently in place under domestic law. For example, U.S. law exempts the
governments against patent infringement suits in federal courts, so long as the state
provides remedies that satisfy the due process provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id.
118

See Michèle Rivasi, Parliamentary Questions: ACTA and Access to Medicine, EUR.
PARLIAMENT (Nov. 8, 2010), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=WQ
&reference=P-2010-9346&format=XML&language=EN.
119

See Parliamentary Questions: Answer Given by Mr. De Gucht on Behalf of the
Commission, EUR. PARLIAMENT (Dec. 14, 2010), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/
sides/getAllAnswers.do?reference=P-2010-9346&language=EN.
120

See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e) (2006).

121

See FINAL TEXT, supra note 3, at ch. 2, § 2, art. 9.

122

Id.
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National Archives and Records Administration from liability for any
infringement of copyrights or related rights arising out of their official
business of archival.123 Various other exemptions exist both in liability
and in limitations on exclusive rights in the contexts of certain
performances, secondary transmissions by satellite carriers, and secondary
transmissions of network stations.124 Though it seems unlikely the ACTA
intends to overwrite and eliminate these provisions, the text makes no
explicit provision for them.125
[26] Although critics claim that this omission creates an insolvable
conflict,126 the ACTA does not require a court to always grant monetary
damages, but merely authorizes it to do so.127 Awarding monetary
damages for copyright infringement is well within the court’s available
remedies, so the ACTA’s damages provision creates no conflict with U.S.
law.128
[27] The debate continues over whether to define the ACTA as a treaty
or executive agreement.129 As distinguished by the U.S. Department of
State, the principal difference between the two definitions is the

123

See 44 U.S.C. § 2117 (2006).

124

See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 110 (2006); 17 U.S.C. § 122 (2006); 17 U.S.C. § 119 (a).

125

See generally FINAL TEXT, supra note 3.

126

See Grant Gross, New Version of ACTA Copyright Pact Gets Mixed Reviews,
PCWORLD (Oct. 7, 2010, 5:30 PM), http://www.pcworld.com/businesscenter/
article/207227/new_version_of_acta_copyright_pact_gets_mixed_reviews.html; Declan
McCullagh, Google Attorney Slams ACTA Copyright Treaty, CNET NEWS (May 7, 2010,
10:58 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-20004450-38.html.
127

See FINAL TEXT, supra note 3, at ch. 2, § 2, art. 9.

128

See 17 U.S.C. § 504(a) (2006).

129

See Mike Masnick, BSA Falsely Claims ACTA Is A Treaty That Has Already Been
Signed
By
37
Countries,
TECHDIRT
(Oct.
12,
2010,
9:47
AM),
http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20101011/00590611356/bsa-falsely-claims-acta-is-atreaty-that-has-already-been-signed-by-37-countries.shtml.
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requirement of Senate approval.130 Some ACTA supporters describe it as
a treaty,131 while others persist with the executive agreement
characterization.132 The European Commissioner for Trade refers to the
ACTA as a treaty, but perhaps the distinction is lost outside of U.S.
borders.133
IV. A LACK OF TRANSPARENCY
[28] The ACTA’s negotiations have been “subject to intense but
needless secrecy.”134 Leaked communications between the negotiating
parties reveal prohibitively high secrecy.135 “The level of confidentiality
in these ACTA negotiations has been set at a higher level than is
customary for non-security agreements. . . . [I]t is impossible for member
states to conduct necessary consultations with IPR stakeholders and
legislatures under this level of confidentiality.”136

130

See Treaty vs. Executive Agreement, supra note 26.

131

See, e.g., Countries Representing More than Half of World Trade Agree to
Criminalize Copyright Piracy, Including Software License Infringement by End Users,
BUS. SOFTWARE ALLIANCE (Oct. 6, 2010), available at http://www.bsa.org/country/
News%20and%20Events/News%20Archives/en/2010/en-10062010-acta.aspx.
132

See, e.g., Thomas Sydnor, ACTA: USTR Was Right, and the Histrionics Were Wrong-Again, PROGRESS & FREEDOM FOUND. (Apr. 23, 2010, 10:37 AM), http://blog.pff.org/
archives/2010/04/acta_ustr_was_right_and_the_histrionics_were_wrong.html.
133

See Love, supra note 104.

134

Letter to Obama, supra note 109.

135

Even ACTA’s name obfuscates information. Indeed, it is something of a misnomer.
At its heart, “ACTA is not a counterfeiting treaty, but a copyright treaty.” Michael Geist,
The ACTA Internet Chapter: Putting the Pieces Together, MICHAEL GEIST (Nov. 3,
2009), http://www.michaelgeist.ca/content/view/4510/99999/.
136

Viewing Cable 08ROME1337, BERLUSCONI GOVERNMENT AND IPR -- FIRST
SIGNS OF LIFE, WIKILEAKS (Feb. 3, 2011), http://wikileaks.ch//cable/2008/
11/08ROME1337.html.
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[29] The United States and the European Union have likely been the
most influential players upon the agreement’s development.137 Indeed,
these parties have drafted the majority of changes between iterations.138
Some commentators speculate that the finalized text compromises
between the staunchly opposing views of these two parties.139 Though
those with the most political and economic clout dominated the
negotiations, other parties’ influences also influenced the outcome.
Leaked agreements revealed commentary attributed to various other
parties.140 Myriad lobbying groups provided input, but not all gained
access to the secret negotiating drafts.141 In fact, the USTR provided
drafts of the ACTA generated during negotiations to several U.S.
corporations in advance of any authorized public access.142 A Swedish
cable communication attributed statements to the European Union’s
ACTA negotiator describing this imbalance of disclosure: “[T]he
European Commission is concerned that the [U.S. government] has close

137

See Michael Geist, ACTA Coming Down to Fight Between U.S. and Europe, MICHAEL
GEIST (July 15, 2010), http://www.michaelgeist.ca/content/view/5199/125/ (stating that
“most of the agreement boils down to the U.S. v. the E.U.”).
138

See id.

139

See, e.g., Drew Wilson, ACTA Negotiations – US-EU Divide Being Settled, Text Being
Finalized, ZEROPAID (Aug. 23, 2010), http://www.zeropaid.com/news/90363/actanegotiations-us-eu-divide-being-settled-text-being-finalized/; see also EU-US Food Fight
Hampers ACTA Talks, EURACTIV (Aug. 19, 2010), http://www.euractiv.com/en/trade/euus-food-fight-hampers-acta-talks-news-496958.
140

See,
e.g.,
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TRADE
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Predecisional/Deliberative
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July
1,
2010),
available
at
http://www.publicknowledge.org/files/docs/ACTA_consolidatedtext.pdf.
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See James Love, White House Shares the ACTA Internet Text with 42 Washington
Insiders, Under Non Disclosure Agreements, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT’L (Oct. 13,
2009, 16:10), http://keionline.org/node/660 (listing all “[p]ersons who received the
ACTA Internet text who are members of ITAC 15 – the Industry Trade Advisory
Committee on Intellectual Property Rights”.).
142

See id (citing Table 1, which lists the “names of persons [and their respective
companies] who received the documents under the NDA, or as members of the USTR
advisory board . . . .”).
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consultation with U.S. industry, while the EU does not have the same
possibility . . . .”143
[30] The USTR shared incomplete drafts with the upper crust of private
industry, but refused to match this transparency with consumer rights
groups, small businesses, or the general public.144
Freedom of
Information Act requests targeting the negotiating drafts were denied, but
they did uncover a list of names of those who received the ACTA Internet
text either under Nondisclosure Agreement or as part of a USTR Advisory
Board.145 These corporate members “included Google, eBay, Dell, Intel,
Business Software Alliance, Rupert Murdoch’s News Corporation, Sony
Pictures, Time Warner, the Motion Picture Association of America, and
Verizon.”146 The insight granted to and feedback gathered from these
business giants undoubtedly provides them superior ammunition with
which to lobby than that afforded to small businesses and individuals.
Public Knowledge, one of only two non-commercial entities included on
the special advisory committee, described the experience as a “minuscule
glimpse” with “any suggestions [it] made go[ing] into a black box of a
process.”147
Further compounding the agreement’s obscurity, the
governmental offices responsible for negotiating the process failed to
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release a draft until several years later.148 In fact, the first official public
draft of the agreement released on April 20, 2010 – over three years since
negotiations first began.149
[31] Those in the public sector also experienced frustration over the
transparency of the ACTA negotiations. In August of 2010, the European
Parliament passed a “[w]ritten declaration on the lack of a transparent
process for the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement.”150 Though nonbinding, the declaration was still a victory for the transparency critics.151
Since that time, negotiations have begun to open to the public eye.152 Four
months later, in December of 2010, negotiations concluded.153 That
month, the USTR requested from the public written commentary on the
completed text.154 Yet, the request described the ACTA as “[c]onsistent
with the Administration’s strategy for intellectual property enforcement”
and “the highest-standard plurilateral agreement yet achieved concerning
the enforcement of intellectual property rights . . . ”155 This language
148

See ANTI-COUNTERFEITING TRADE AGREEMENT (PUBLIC Predecisional/Deliberative
Draft Apr. 2010), available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2010/april/
tradoc_146029.pdf.
149

See id.

150

See Written Declaration on the Lack of a Transparent Process for the AntiCounterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) and Potentially Objectionable Content, EUR.
PARL. DOC. PE439.564v01-00 (2010), available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/
getDoc.do?pubRef=//EP//NONSGML+WDECL+P7-DCL-2010-0012+0+DOC+PDF+
V0//EN&language=EN.
151

See Nate Anderson, European Parliament Passes Anti-ACTA Declaration, ARS
TECHNICA, http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2010/09/european-parliament-passesanti-acta-declaration.ars (last visited Apr. 10, 2011).
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(ACTA), SAIS REV., Summer-Fall 2010, available at http://muse.jhu.edu/
journals/sais_review/v030/30.2.geist.html.
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Fed. Reg. 79,069, 79,069 (Dec. 17, 2010).
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makes it seem that the USTR has already plotted its course and is not open
to deviation. If so, perhaps asking for commentary is merely an empty
gesture, in which case the improved transparency is merely illusory.
While little can be done to remedy past indiscretions and the lack of
openness, perhaps the public dissatisfaction with the negotiation process
will provide lessons moving forward.
V. CONCLUSION
[32] Despite apparent enthusiasm from certain segments of big-industry
and government entities,156 the ACTA elicits skepticism from some and
outright vehemence from others.157 Both official and unofficial leaked
versions of the text have shed scarce insight to the otherwise taciturn
developmental history of the agreement.158 The criticism targeting the
ACTA stems not just from the shroud of secrecy enveloping its evolution,
but also the substantive provisions advocated by the negotiating parties.159
Indeed, a statement endorsed by “over 90 academics, practitioners and
public interest organizations from six continents” noted the “public
criticism of the unusually closed process and widespread disquiet over the
negotiations’ presumed substance.”160 The group concluded “that the
terms of the publicly released draft of [the] ACTA threaten numerous
public interests, including every concern specifically disclaimed by
negotiators.”161
156

See Barry Sookman, Support for ACTA Urged by Over 20 Leading Organizations,
BARRY SOOKMAN (Nov. 20, 2009), http://www.barrysookman.com/2009/11/20/supportfor-acta-urged-by-over-20-leading-organizations/.
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[33] At an extreme, some doubt the very constitutionality of the
agreement.162 Yet the tides of iteration have washed away those
provisions that would have required changes in U.S. law. The remaining
problem with the ACTA cannot be remedied so easily. The pervasive lack
of transparency has left the public feeling hoodwinked, now left only with
the opportunity to provide an impotent critique of a finished product.
Nonetheless, the ACTA forges on. Indeed, by the time this Article
reaches print, the ratification process will have begun.
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See, e.g., Sean Flynn, ACTA's Constitutional Problem, AM. U. (Nov. 15, 2010),
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